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There is no doubt that China's transition away from communism has been gradual aiid relatively , 
smooth. But, how have the Chinese gradually transformed their political and economic systems? This : 
question captures the very nature of the process of Chinese transition. And this "how" question leads 
I : 
' ' to the "why" question, that is: Why have Chinese transformed their system gradually? :They did it , 
! 
gradually in comparison with what has taken place in some other former communist countries. A study i 
' 
of the process of the gradualist transition in China will highlight the mechanisms of political-economic : 
transition. Such a study will also shed lights on the many problems that former Ea&t European : 
\ 
communist countries (including former Soviet Union) are currently dealing with. 
' East Europe tries to make a transformation to the "West European model" as quickl~ as possible, · 
with the essential core of the transition being centered on the aggressive and rapid establishment of well-
defined private property rights. The well-defined private property rights are regarded as <l;Il absolutely 




1 Martin Weitzman, "Economic Transition: Can Theory Help?" European Economic Review, Vol.37, · 
No.2/3, pp.549-556. In a properly functioning capitalist market economy, a reward system--that of the 
private property rights-is set up to prevent shirking and make the owner the true residual claimant. In 
this system, the "wedge" of true private property blocks the infinite regress of inefficiency and shirking 
that characterized the old socialist regime, because the true property owners have the! power, and 
incentives, to stop losses and encourage profitability at the point where they are wedged into the 
hierarchy. For theories of property rights, see Harold Demsetz, "Towards a Theory of Prop~rty Rights," . 
American Economic Review, Vol.57, No.2, 1967, pp.347-359; Armen Alchian and Haro,ld Demsetz,' 
"Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, Vol.62, 
No.5, 1972 pp.777-795; Erik Furubotn and Svetozar Pejevich, ed., The Economics of Property Rights, 
(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974); Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions ofCapitalism,!(New York: 
1 
strategy in East Europe concentrates on developing such basic institutions of capitalism as well-defined 
ownership rights, with a corresponding legal system, commercial code, contract and banlajnptcy laws, 
and so forth. However, this radical approach has not yielded much success, not to mention the problems · 
i 
that have been brought up by it. I 
' 
I 
Interestingly, the success of Chinese transition results from the expansion of the domain of i 
ambiguity of the property rights. In other words, the third economic sector2 and TVE,' where the 
property rights are the most ambiguous, have led the economic growth, absorbed the surplus labor, 
' 
released the political tension, and calmed down the social unrest. While the growth rate of the industrial ' 
' I 
I I 
output of the state-own enterprises was 8.4% from 1979-1991, that of the TYE reached 25.3% during i 
, I 
' ' 
the same period of time.4 Here we have two inter-related "why" questions: (i) Why is this vaguely- : 
Free Press, 1985); Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory 
of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94, No.4, 1986, pp.691-719; · 
Oliver Hart and John Moore, "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journaliof Political· 
Economy, Vol.98, No.6, 1990, pp.1119-1158; and William Riker and Itai Sened, "The Origins of the, 
Property Rights," American Journal of Political Sdence, Vol.35, No.4, 1991, pp.951-69. · 
2 The third economic sector includes service, food, communication, real estate, etc, while the first 
economic sector refers to agriculture and the second producer goods industry. See ZHANµ Tianrong, 
et al., Zhongguo Gaige Dacidian, (Beijing: China International Broadcasting Press, 1992),1 p.851. 
I 
I 
3 TVE stands for township/village-owned enterprise. It is collectively owned by all the ~eople in the 
community--township or village--where it is located. There is no stipulation of any indiv\dual owners 
nor does anyone have rights to appropriate assets of the enterprise. It is meaningless to talk about selling 
or transferring TVE shares, since there are no shares at all. Reward structures are extremely vague and 
informal. The community government determines the amount and form of the benefits which the 
collective owners, who coincide with the members of the community, may receive. TVEs have spread 
into all economic sectors, but are more prosperous in consumer goods industries and the service sector. 
For a more detailed study of the nature of the TYE, see Martin Weitzman and Chenggang Xu, "Chinese 
Township-Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives," Journal of Comparative, Economics, 
Vol.18, 1994, pp.,121-145. i 
! 
4 Martin Weitzman and Chenggang Xu, "Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as Vagiiely Defined 
' Cooperatives," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol.18, 1994, p.128. The original data is from 
China's State Statistical Bureau Yearbooks, 1986-1992. 
1 
2 
defined property rights model chosen? and (ii) Why has this model been successful in transforming the 
Chinese political-economic system? 
I 
LITERATURE REVIEW I I 
I . 
There is an increasing number of studies on the gradual approach versus the radical ',approach in 
political-economic transition! The application of theories and concepts from positive politi6a.J. economy 
i ! 
to the process of transition in the socialist states has produced some preliminary explanations.: One aspect: 
' 
I 
of that transition --establishing the property rights - has much to learn from the well-developed body of i 
: 
work within political economy on the dynamics of political-economic reform, the origins and effects of · 




While studying the property rights in the transitory systems, Martin L. Weitzman;provides us ! 
' 
I 
with an explanation to the two "why" questions I raised at the end of the last section.• .Weitzman's ' 
I 
explanation of the transition questions coincides with the political culture explanation offered to analyze 
I 
5 For examples, see Peter Murrell, "Evolutionary and Radical Approaches-to Econon¥c Reform," 
Economics of Planning, Vol.25, 1992, pp. 79-95; Martin Weitzman, "Economic Transition: j Can Theory : 
Help?" European Economic Review, Vol.37, No.2/3, pp.549-556; Anders Aslund, "The Cas~ for Radical 
Reform, Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.4, 1994, pp.63-74; Leszek Balcerowicz, "U11derstanding 
Postcommunist Transitions," Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.4, 1994, pp.75-89; Martin Weitzman and 
Chenggang Xu, "Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives,:" Journal of 
Comparative Economics, Vol.18, 1994, pp.121-145; and Fabrizio Coricelli and Gian Jl4aria Milesi-
1 
Ferretti, "On the Credibility of 'Big Bang' Program: A Note on Wage Claims and Soft Budget. 
Constraints in Economies in Transition," European Economic Review, Vol.37, 1993, pp.387-95. I 
I ' 
6 Martin Weitzman, "Economic Transition: Can Theory Help?" European Economic ReJew, Vol.37, 
1 
No.2/3, pp.549-556. See also Martin Weitzman and Chenggang Xu, "Chinese Towrtship-Village 
Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives," Journal of Comparative Economics, v?L 18, 1994, 
pp.121-145. ' 
3 
the East Asian miracle.7 Weitzman, a Harvard economist, uses A. to explain the gradualist transition. 
For him, the parameter A stands for the ability of a group of people to resolve prisoner's dilemma type 
' 
free-riding problems internally, without the imposition of explicit legalistic rules ofbehavior.j A is treated : 
' ! 
as a more or less given function of "culture," such as cooperativeness. For instance, East A~ia is a high- ' 
I 
A society with a cooperative culture relative to Europe with a non-cooperative culture. So, Weitzman 
i 
I 
concludes that the choice <if the gradualist transition and the resultant economic success are the result of 
the East Asian cooperative culture. 
This "their-culture-makes-them-do-it" explanation is highly tautological. Weitzman might be 
I 
I I 
correct if he assumes that the "culture" has not changed too much for the past three or four decades in ; 
China. Contrary to Weitzman's explanation, however, the "high value of A." or social cooperativeness, 
' did not save China from the political and economic disasters under the state socialism during the Mao ' 
era. Neither did the social cooperativeness save China from the repeated games of class struggle during 
' the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, China's economy has experienced rapid growth during the post-Mao: 
I I 
' ' 
era when the free market mechanisms and individualism are gradually introduced. Again, w~y has China ' 
gradually transformed itself? Or what are the essential mechanisms of political and economic transition? 
Adam Przeworski offers insight to an alternative explanation. He maintains that trtjnsformation 
I 
is possible only if there exist institutions that provide a reasonable expectation that major political forces 
would not be affected highly adversely under the future competition.' 
' 
7 For example, see Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle anµmg Japan, ' 
Europe, and America, (New York: Warner Books, 1992). For a quick review of the approach, see. 
Winckler/Greenhalgh, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, (1988)'. 
I 
8 Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome," in Jon Bister and Rune Slagstad, eds, 
Constitutionalism and Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.69.i 
I 
4 
I would like to push one step further Przeworski' s argument about political strategy in economic , 
: 
transition, and hypothesize that the success of a transitional reform results from satisfying the needs of : 
i ; 
those who are in the position to formulate as well as to implement the reform agenda. The political- i 
economic process of China's transition demonstrates this essential aspect of the mechanisms Jf transition. , 
I ' 
I ; 
DUAUSM VERSUS THE MULTI-TRACK ECONOMIC SYSI'EM 
I 
China has transformed itself from a uni-track or dual-track economic system to ~ multi-track i 
economic system during the post-Mao period. 
Many Transition scholars still use dualism to describe the socialist economy in transition. But 
I 
to say the best, the term "dualism" is always confusing. The dual economy has different meanings for 
I 
different authors. For Oscar Lange' and Janos Kornai,10 it refers to the public versus private ownership 
! 
of means of production. For some China scholars, e.g. Louise Putterman and Hla Myint, it;refers to the 
division of a modern or industrial sector versus a traditional or agrarian sector." Some :other China : 
scholars regard a dual economy as production and exchanges "within plan and out of plan.jm 
I 
' 
'Oscar Lange, "On the Economic Theory of Socialism," Review of Economic Studies, Vdl.4, October 
1936 and February 1937, pp.53-71, & 123-42. ' 
10 Janos Kornai, "The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Reality," in Vi6tor Nee and 
I 
David Stark, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe,, 
(Stanford: Stanford University, 1989), p.83. ! , 
I ' 
11 For examples, see Louise Putterman, "Dualism and Reform in China," Economic Development & 
1 
Cultural Change, Vol.40, No.3, 1992, pp.467-93; and Hla Myint, "The Neoclassical R~urgence in I 
Development Economics: Its Strength and Limitations," in Gerald M. Merier, ed., !Pioneers in' 
Development, Second Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.123-4. I ' 
12 For example, see Susan Shirk, "The Political Economy of Chinese Industrial Refom\," in Victor! 
Nee and David Stark, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe, 
(Stanford: Stanford University, 1989), p.355. 
5 
In this last case, many of them have concentrated their work on the price 
regulations. 13 They view price distortion as the root of socialist inefficiency. Therefore, fori them, price : 
I ' 
reform is the essential way to salvage the Chinese economy. A dual-track price system is sckn either as i 
I I 
an initial step to the lassez-jaire "heaven"14 or as another distortion which would lead the China's reform I 
d d d 15 W"th th . f . . . d . . lb!" ,. I to a ea -en . 1 a ra er normative tone o cnt1c1sm an an apparent mterest m pu 1c po icy, 
I 
these studies have not explained why the socialist price system was distorted in the first place, why the 
I 
I 
price dualism was then introduced, and how it was introduced, or whether it was introduced alone or in I 
- I 
a package together with other reform programs. 
I 
But more important, the communist economy in China had been in effect a "dual-track" economy 
' 
I 
even before the end of the Cultural Revolution.16 It involved public, collective, and private ownership 
I 
' of means of production; and it involved production and exchanges within and out of plan. However, it 
i 
is the multi-track system developed under the post-Mao reform that has gradually transformed. the Chinese 
economy away from the planned economy and gradually dissolved the public ownership of means of 
i 
production. The within-versus-out-of-plan dichotomy is misleading in describing the post-M~o economy. : 
I 
13 For examples, see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1993); and William A. Byrd, The Market Mechanism and Econo(nic Reforms 
in China, (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1991). 
14 For examples, see Peter Harrold, China's Reform Experience to Date, (Washington! The World 
Bank, 1992); Nicholas Lardy, "Socialism in East Asia: Vietnam, Mongolia, and North Kore~" in Gilbert. 
Rozman, ed., Dismantling Communism: Common Causes and Regional Variations, (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992); and Nicholas Lardy, Kenneth Liebertbal, and David B4chman, The, 
Future of China, (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, [NBRAnalysis, Vol.3, ,o.2], 1992).; 
15 For an example, see Franz Michael et al., China and the Crisis of Marxism-Leninisin, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), pp.74-82, & 112-113. \ 
i ' 
" Christine P. W. Wong, "Ownership and Control in Chinese Industry: The Maoistj Legacy and' 
Prospects for the 1980s," in U.S. Congress Joint Committee, China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 
2000, Vol.1, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986); and Carl Riskin, Chi¥'s Political 
Economy: the Quest for Development since 1949, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
6 I 
New development in the post-Mao economy enjoys a variety of mixture of planning and exchange. I am 
going to use primarily one product-Le. coal-to illustrate my point. 
I 
' I 
(1) Within the plan, there are at least three different plans, which include the cend:ally unified ; 
I 
plan, the sectoral plan,17 and the local plans. The central plan is formulated and imposed by the State 
I 
' Council and the State Planning Commission; the sectoral plan by respective central ministri~ that are in ! 
charge of different economic sectors. The local plans include the provincial plan and the municipal and : 
county plans. These plans are different from each other in terms of scale, specialty, and rigidity. : 
Sectoral plans cover more industrial products than municipal plans. Provincial plans are more rigid than , 
' i 
country plans. These different plans plus the newly emerged market have formed a multi-layer system i 
of production and exchange in post-Mao China, as depicted in Figure 1. 





Out of Plan 
In the post-Mao reform, the central plan has been shrinking relative to all other plans. The 
17 For example, power plants and steel plants under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Goal Industry 
(MCI) basically fulfil the sectoral plans issued by the MCI. I 
I 
18 Another way to describe the post-Mao economy is done by many Chinese economis~ in terms of 
its management system: mandatory planning, directory planning, and market adjustrnept. For an' 
example, see WEI Liqun, "Jing.ii Guanli Sanmong Xinshi Huafeng Banfa Chutan" (Preliminary inquiry 
of economic management in three models), Jing.ii Wenti Tansuo, 1984, No.4, pp.6-8. I 
7 
sectoral plan was newly introduced at the peak of the post-Mao reform. It was introduced as the 
ministerial responsibility system (bumen baoganzhi). Under the ministerial responsibility system, each : 
ministry has the authority to plan its own production and control its own sales. Tue ci~ plan was i 
extended to more than a dozen of cities in 1985 when these cities gained the newly establiJed status of i 
"Central Cities" (zhongxin chengshi). The significance of this multi-layer system is simple[ that is: the I 
I I 
sectoral plan and local plans allow individual ministries and local governments to sell the ~roducts that I 
l I 
they control at prices higher than the state-fixed prices, hence to share more benefits of ithe national : 
economy than they did before the post-Mao reform. 
Take another example. A multi-level coal price system was vigorously advocated in 1984 by 
I 
directors of Provincial Bureaus of Coal Industry, 19 and was later adopted by the Center. In ~multi-level 
! 
coal price system, the province gained the authority to make decisions concerning coal prifes for local I 
government-run enterprises, (but was not necessarily responsible for the supply of coal ~or all local ! 
enterprises). 
Some scholars describe the post-Mao price system as a tri-track system of the plann\:d price, the 
' 
higher price within the plan, and the market price. 20 Barna Tlilas sees it as a tri-price system of (i) fixed 
prices (dingjia), official prices (paijia), or mandatory plan prices (zhiling xingjihuajiage)! (ii) floating 
: 





"Tue Ministry of Coal Industry, PRC, China Coallndustry Yearbook 1985, (Hong Konk: Economic~ 
Information & Agency), p.90. J 
20 ZHANG Yizhong, "Dangqian Woguo Shiyou Jiage Cunzai de Wenti ji dui Guonlin Jingji de 




jiage) or maximized prices; and (iii) free prices (ziyoujiage) or market price (shijia). 21 Some others i 
i 
discuss it as a tri-track system of the state price, the local (state) price, and the market price.22 ~ 
According to the Director of the State Price Bureau, the post-Mao administration managed thlee different 
price systems of the state fixed price, the state guidance price, and the market adjustment Jrice. 
I 
(2) Empirically, in China, plans refer to those that are made by planning committeeS at different 
levels of the government; and out of plan refers to productions, exchanges, and other econo1c activities I 
I 
that are organized by other divisions of the government or the enterprises themselves. Decisions ; 
concerning production and exchanges by the ministries are also considered as plans, i.e. the sktoral plan. i 
I I 
/ I I 
Under the multi-layer system, each enterprise fulfills a different combination of cen~al and local I 
I I 
plans, and it can also conduct its own production and exchanges, i.e. the out of plan actiJities.23 For I 
I I 
I : 
instance, the center- and ministry-run coal mines need to fulfil a high central plan target, and fulfil some , 
i 
I ' local plan targets in order to insure the access of local infrastructure. In fulfilling the local plflllS, the coal 1 
' I 
mines provide coal at a relatively low price to local users in exchange for the use of local infrastructure, I 
I 
such as water and electricity. Then, these coal mines can sell the over-quota products on the market at 
I 
' 
higher prices. This last proportion of coal is usually meant "out of plan." Many enterl:>rises under 
I 
I 
21 See his book Economic Reforms and Political Reform Attempts in China: 1979-1989, l(New York: . ' Springer-Verlag, 1991). ! 
I 
22 Lill Wen and YIN Shanwen, "Muqian Zhuyao Shengchan Ziliao Guojia Tongpei Bizhbng he Jiage' 
Qingkuang" (The current situation of the proportion of the state-allocated major production riiaterials and 
their prices), Jingji Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao, 1988, p.15. , I 
23 For a detailed discussion of how new management programs are introduced in 4e post-Mao! 
reform, see Peter N. S. Lee, Industrial Management and Economic Reform in China: 1949t1984, (New: 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), and "Enterprise Autonomy Policy in Post-Mao China: A Case 
' Study of Policy-Making, 1978-1983," The China Quarterly, No.105, March 1986, pp.t5-71. The. 
autonomy of the enterprises has been increased step by step through these new management programs. 
9 
! ' 
municipal administration are assigned to fulfil central plans, provincial plans, and m~nicipal plarui, 
I 
although central plan targets assigned are not as high as those for the central enterprises (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Relationship between Ownership and Allocation 
Enternrises by Ownership Allocation of Outout 
state (the State Council and commissions) ................. r--------.-i-----,~ 
central m1mstry ................................................ . 
provincial government......................................... c.~ .. tr ... 1 PIM 
municipal/county government ............................... . 
collective......................................................... Loco.I l'la." 
private............................................................ I Out o'i Pla.') 
\ f I I 
Statistics in China, unfortunately, has not been collected systematically along there categori9, 
and hence are unavailable for researchers or the government itself. Based on the existin~ statistics an~ 
information of the production and exchange of coal in 1985, Figure 2 shows thJJ estimates ~f 
configuration of different allocation outcomes in the coal industry. The state plan decreases as the lev~I 
of ownership within the government hierarchy decreases. The collective and private entebrises are nJt 





(3) There is always some ambiguity between plans and out of plan. Coordina~ coal (xiezuo 
met), coordinated electricity (xiezuo dian), and other so-called "products to be processed" (11liao jiagoni) 
well illustrate this ambiguity. Coordinated coal is coal sold and bought in a situation siniilL to the b~r 
trade, where the prospective buyer provides raw materials for the producer/seller to procesl. Coal mi_n~ 
may provide coal to the power plant in exchange of electricity at a price lower that the market price. 
I 
I 
Steel works may save some extra coal and transfer it to the power plant for electricity. The trade is the 
same for the coordinated electricity and all the "products to be processed." TuJ exchange ;s 
"coordinated" because it is done under coordination between the two parties, and somelimes with ~e 
10 
guidance and assistance of the government agencies. The price of the coordinated products· is normally 
between the planned price and the market price. 
The coordinated products and their ambiguity add much complexity of the Chinese economic 
system. The exchange of the coordinated products is sometimes considered as within plan, because the 
products are not sold in the market and the exchange is coordinated by the governmeht agencies; 
i 
sometimes as out of plan, because the exchange involved is only coordinated but not man~ated by the 
' 
government; and some other times, is set apart distinctively in the annual statistical report as the 
I 
coordinated output or processed output. In most cases the finished products are not enlisted in the 
I 
' centrally planned bureaucratic allocation, yet the producer is obliged not to sell them to th~ market but 
I 
directly to the provider. 
Jiangsu official fuel company, like all other official corporations, handles more and;more barter 
trade. As the barter trade is growing (see Figure 3), three important implications merit close attention. , 
First, the more the barter trade, the more the resource-holders benefit. Major resources le primarily : 
' 
held by the government-owned enterprises. Barter trade is one kind of deviation away from the state 
planning. In this deviation, the enterprises have more autonomy. They can contract with individual 
I 
buyers instead of just fulfilling the state plan targets. They can sell their products at prices, higher than 
I 
the state-fixed prices. Autonomy and profits thus become a doubt-edged sword that post-Mab enterprises 
I 
learn to enjoy. 
Figure 3 here. I 
I 
Second, the beneficiaries in the barter trade demand for more exchang~ in the baiter trade. It 
11 
is easy to appreciate the reason of so doing. Barter trade becomes a safe net that the enterprises can , 
control the sale while they exchange among resource-holders. This is another doubt-edgedlsword. On; 
one hand, the efficiency is increased as a result of the increased autonomy and profits."' 0n the other I 
hand, exchange among resource-holders, i.e. predominantly govermilent-owned enterpris1, allow the I 
state to keep the resources to itself. While the enterprises want to make more profits and face a choice 
1 
between barter trade and !llarket exchange, the government is more willing to coordinate the barter trade 





Finally, expansion of the barter trade, while fulfilling the plan targets, decreases the'government I 
I I 
I 
planning or the mandatory plan. Table 1 shows that the planned supply of coal that is mariaged by the 
I 
official Jiangsu Provincial Fuel Company decreased proportionally from 1978 to 1989. 
Table 1: Coal Traded by the Jiangsu Provincial Fuel Company (in 106t)25 
=================================================' 
Year 1978 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1988 1989 
I 
Total 17.85 18.53 20.00 21.84 23.89 30.59 35.43 34.90 
a) of which, from I 
State mines 12.08 12.49 11.35 11.12 11.07 10.16 10.16 10.65 
Local mines 3.72 3.48 2.85 3.06 3.28 2.51 2.35 2.20 
' Barter trade 1.95 2.56 5.80 7.31 9.53 17.35 22.92 21.89 
b) of which, for I I 








"' This is a very generalized statement, and it is correct especially if it refers to a long time horizon. , 
25 Data from JJL. 
12 
( 4) It is also important to know that the existing literature often ignores the institutional aspect 
of the system itself, or the quasi property rights that have been created by different institutipnal control ' 
I , 
over the products, the allocation channels, and the prices. Those who can physically control the products 
I 
will control the allocation channels--i.e. via the state, local, or the market--and the prices of the products. 
As shown in Table 2, the central government controlled 54% of the total coal production L Jiangsu in I 
1988, the Province and its major cities controlled 19%, and TVEs controlled 27%. The Jtate-run (da 
guoying) coal mines allocate the majority of their products via the central and local piing. The i 
' province and city-run coal mines allocate a large proportion of their products via local pliinning. Thei 
I i 
I 
TVEs sell their products on the market. 
I 
As shown in Figure 4, the TVEs share more and more coal in Jiangsu, while that shared by the I 
[ 
government-run coal mines is gradually decreasing. If we put this figure together with Figure 2 and 
I 
Figure 3, it is not hard to image how the gradual change tool place. While the TVEs are expanding, the 
government-run enterprises also conduct more and more their economic activities--proµuction and 
exchange-out of plan. 
Table 2: Coal Production in Jiangsu Province by Ownership Type (in 10't)26 
===========================================1===== 
Year 1982 1983 1988 I 
Total ~-8. ~;~--------------------~~~~~;--------------~~~~-is __________ T ____________  
State-run 
Province/ 
(100%) (100%) (100%) 
I 
12.510 [by 17] 12.333 [by 16]* 
(68%) 
4.211 [by 53] 
12.830 [by 16] 
(67%) 
4.428 [by 53] 
(54%) 
4.361 [by 41] 
26 The MCI, China Coal Industry Yearbook: I985, pp.189-90; China Coal Industry Yeatbook: I986, 





Figure 4 here. 
(24%) 
1.485 [by 131] 
(8%) 
(23%) 





The criticism of dualism here aims at highlighting the multi-layer institutional arrangement of the . 
post-Mao economy. In this respect, the allocation system is regarded as the core of China's multi-layer' 
' 
economy. In a planned economy where virtually all exchanges are, theoretically, regulatef! and where; 
i 
the value of resources is often not directly expressed in real monetary terms, the bureaucratic channel of' 
I 
resource allocation becomes vital. Whether you can make profits depends on how much production input: 
you can get through the central plan at a low price. In the multi-layer system or the mix~ economy, 
the different allocation channels become so important that they form the crux to which all kinds of. 
conflicts and exchanges would ultimately lead. Each enterprise wants to sell its products at hjgher prices-
-out-of-plan prices--and buy the production input at lower prices--the state fixed prices. If the post-Mao 
economy is regarded as within-versus-out-of-plan dualism or a modem-versus-traditional dualism, then 
' 
it had existed all along the history of communist China; hence it would help us little to explain the 
I 
particular benefits produced by the post-Mao reform. 
WHY A MULTI-TRACK SYSIBM I 
A multi-track economic system in the post-Mao China satisfies virtually all of thosb who are in 
! 
the position to formulate as well as to implement the reform agenda. If we understand th~ nature and 





the reformers to try to make as many people happy as possible, in order to avoid obstructionalism. To 
explain why multi-track system is introduced in China, I elaborate the following propositions (or rather 
hypotheses to be tested). 
(1) Political leaders promote policy formulas based on selective allocation which enable ~em to reap j 
political support instead of policy formulas based on universal rules."' And policy-mak~rs are more I 
likely to initiate a reform program in which benefits are more concentrated and costs are m~re diffused; I 
because this benefit concentration makes visible favors to selected beneficiaries for political support, and ; 
' ' ' because this cost diffusion reduces the amount of burden each unit might have to carry. 28 ~ multi-track I 
system allows the reformers to deliver concentrated benefits to a maximum number of beneficiaries 
1 
instead of a "wasteful" and "useless" policy that is based on universal rules. 
Physical control over resources generates benefits in a (predominately) planned econo,my, because 
money alone cannot buy things in a society in which goods are rationed. A multi-track system puts ' 
resources into many different hands, hence generating benefits for various resource-holders,- As one of' 
the major institutional development in the post-Mao reform, the multi-layer economic syst~m channels 
public benefits to different groups of individuals. 
(2) This multi-layer institutional arrangement also generated and regulated both political a/ld economic 
I 
behaviors. In an economy where resources were scarce and socioeconomic activities were primarily 
27 Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, (Berkeley: University of California, 
1993), pp.55-69. I 
I 
28 Morris P. Fiorina, "Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authorify," in Roger 






regulated, allocation of scarce resources became a paramount factor in determining the rules of the game 
I 
and winning or losing status. The multi-track system provides incentives for resource-holders to move 
' I I I 
away from the rigid central planning, or a chance for survival for those who are not ready to abandon! 
'al' I I SOC! Ism. ' 
I 
I 
(3) I further argue that: only by feeding first the ideological and material appetites of ve5ted interests I 
I 
can the reformers succeed in a smooth transition. While feeding the vested interests, the refbrmers move 
I I 
their reform agenda forward one step at a time. Meanwhile, these reforms make their own progress by I 
creating new groups of vested interests. Continuous "feeding" of the newly emerged vested Lterests gets ! 
the politico-economic transition moving forward. 
: ! 
For instance, the government allows the bureaucrats and managers to use the government funds 
' I 
' I 
to set up new firms in the third economic sector. If they make profits, the profits are theirs;' if they lose, 
they are not liable for the loss, and they can exit and return to the old bureaucracy. This ~freedom, or 
I 
rather the unjustifiable privilege, of the bureaucrats has been supported by two major factors. First, the 
' 
' property rights of these new firms are extremely ambiguous. Second, policy loopholes pr?vide a good 
chance for success. Such policy loopholes include local reinterpretation--sometimes intentionhl distortion-
' 
I 
-of central policies. 29 On the other hand, success of new firms attracts more people, I hence more 








29 Many a time, local officials intentionally reinterpret central policies to fit their local iriterests. For 
more discussion of this problem, see Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State, (Stanfotd: Stanford 
University Press, 1988); and Martin K. Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in Chinlz, (Berkeley: 





guarantee a smooth transformation of the powerful revolutionary veterans 
i 
and their families into a 
powerful yet corrupt, hence wealthy, bureaucratic class, then into a profit-making entrepreneur class in, 
a market economy. The ambiguity of the property rights characterizes one dimension of thJ corruption. ' 
This corruption is not just an unfortunate by-product of economic reforms, but might be a "necessary" 
mechanism of political-economic transition. 
CONCLUSION I 
I 
This paper (i) characterizes one major phase of the Chinese gradualist transition as the expansion: 
I . 
of the multi-track economic system, and (ii) explain the rationale of a policy of multi-tra~k economy I 
chosen by the reformers. 
I 
The communist economy in China had been in effect a dual-track economy before the end of the 
i 
Cultural Revolution. It is the multi-track system developed and expanded under the post-Mao reform that 
has gradually transformed the Chinese economy away from the planned economy. The multi-track system 
is a compromise of the reformers to the existing situation. This compromise satisfies some major vested 
interests, such as ministerial bureaucrats and provincial officials. 









Figure 3: Coal Traded by the Jiangsu Provincial Fuel Company 
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